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The Effect of the United States Supreme Court's 
Decisions During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth 
Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction* 1 
Christopher B. Chane/ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The roots of modern federal Indian law were established in a trilogy 
of United States Supreme Court decisions written by Justice John Mar-
shall during the period of 1823 to 1832. In Johnson v. Mclntosh, 3 the Su-
preme Court established the notion of European "discovery" as the basis 
upon which the United States government obtained control over its land, 
but held that the land was subject to the Indian's right to occupy it.4 In 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,5 the Court defined Indian tribes as "domes-
tic dependent nations" and established the trust responsibility that the 
United States holds in relationship to the tribes. Lastly, in Worcester v. 
Georgia,6 the Court disallowed state criminal prosecution of a non-
Indian, holding that state law had no effect in Indian country. While all 
of the original holdings of these cases are no longer considered current in 
Copyright© 2000 by Christopher B. Chaney. 
I. This article is dedicated to our nation's tribal criminal prosecutors. Their hard work and 
dedication is rarely adequately rewarded or acknowledged, however, their contributions to tribal 
sovereignty and public safety in Indian country are monumental. 
2. Christopher B. Chaney received his Bachelor Arts from the University of Oklahoma 
(1984) and Juris Doctor from Brigham Young University's J. Reuben Clark Law School 
( 1992). Mr. Chaney is admitted to practice law in Utah, New Mexico, and in numerous federal 
and tribal courts. He is currently serving as an Assistant United States Attorney in Salt Lake 
City, Utah as a federal Indian country criminal prosecutor. He has also served as prosecuting 
attorney for the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in Dulce, New Mexico and as prosecuting attorney for 
the Southern Ute Tribe in Ignacio, Colorado. Mr. Chaney is an enrolled member of the Seneca-
Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma. The positions taken in this article are the author's only and are not 
necessarily representative of the United States Department of Justice, nor the United States 
Attorney's Office for the District of Utah. 
3. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
4. It has been suggested that the opinion was designed in this manner as a compromise in 
order to validate the United States government's dominance over the land without totally eliminating 
the right of tribes and their members to continue to exist. 
5. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831). 
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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their totality,7 these cases have historically had a profound effect on 
tribal government, including tribal criminal jurisdiction. 
In the mid-1970's, the United States Supreme Court issued another 
trilogy of opinions that have also had a profound effect on tribal criminal 
jurisdiction: United States v. Mazurie, 8 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe,9 and United States v. Wheeler. 10 These opinions, while not of such 
broad political import as the Marshall trilogy in the previous century, 
have had a significant impact on day-to-day life in Indian country in that 
they affect one of the most basic tenets of sovereignty: the ability of a 
government to exercise criminal jurisdiction within its own territory. In-
deed, it could be said that these three cases have dominated tribal crimi-
nal jurisdictional principles for the last quarter century. The time is now 
ripe to review the effect that these cases have had on modem jurispru-
dence. This article will first review the modem trilogy and address the 
progeny of these cases in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Next, the impact that these cases have had in Indian country will be dis-
cussed. Lastly, possible alternatives for improvement will be set forth. 11 
II. THE TRILOGY 
A. Mazurie and its Progeny 
In United States v. Mazurie, the Supreme Court dealt principally 
with criminal jurisdiction over persons that have traditionally held dispa-
rate legal status, particularly Indians, non-Indians, and non-member Indi-
ans.12 But Mazurie also focusses on the delegation of federal legislative 
7. For example, contrary to the original holding of Worcester v. Georl{ia, states now have 
some limited criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, such as where both the suspect and the victim 
are non-Indian, United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 
240 (1896), or where Congress has transferred jurisdiction over Indian country pursuant to Pub. L. 
No. 280, 18 U.S.C. § I I 62, or some other authority. 
8. 419 U.S. 544 (1975). 
9. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
10. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). It should be noted that since 1975, two other Supreme Court deci-
sions have been handed down which also affect tribal criminal jurisdiction: Washinl{ton v. Con{eder-
ated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) and Duro v. Reina, 495 
U.S. 76 (1990). However, the impact of the first case is limited to tribes affected by Public Law 280, 
and the latter case will be discussed as part of the progeny of Oliphant and Wheeler. 
II. During the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has issued numerous opinions that 
affect the territorial reach of laws applicable in Indian country, however, this article will not address 
these types of cases, but, instead will concentrate on the cases which more directly affect the legal 
underpinning of tribal criminal jurisdiction as opposed to its territorial reach. 
12. Indians are usually defined as members of federally-recognized Indian tribes. See, ex 
FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 19-27 ( 1982 ed.)). Qualifications 
for tribal membership are usually set forth by the respective tribe but are sometimes determined by 
application of federal statute. See id. at 20-27. The phrase "non-member Indian" has come to refer to 
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authority to the tribes. Prior to 1953, alcohol was illegal in Indian coun-
try .13 In 1953, Congress passed legislation 14 creating a presumption that 
Indian country would be "dry" unless the tribe authorized alcohol on the 
reservation. 15 The Shoshone Tribe and the Arapahoe Tribe which jointly 
govern the Wind River reservation in Wyoming passed an ordinance le-
galizing alcohol on the reservation. Afterwards, the Blue Bull bar opened 
on non-Indian owned fee land that lay within the reservation boundaries. 
The Blue Bull had obtained a state liquor license and was operating in 
compliance with both tribal and state law. In 1971, the tribes passed Or-
dinance No. 26 which required liquor outlets on the reservation to have 
both a tribal liquor license and a state liquor license. In 1972, the owners 
of the Blue Bull (Martin Mazurie and Margaret Mazurie) applied for a 
tribal liquor license. After hearing testimony about "singing and shooting 
at late hours, disturbances of elderly residents of a nearby housing devel-
opment, and the permitting of Indian minors in the bar,"16 the tribes de-
nied the liquor license application. After closing the bar for three weeks, 
the Mazuries decided to re-open it. The Mazuries were then prosecuted 
in federal court for illegal distribution of alcohol under 18 U.S.C. § 1154 
and were convicted. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's de-
cision 17 only to have the Supreme Court reinstate the convictions. The 
Supreme Court stated that "Indian tribes are unique aggregations pos-
sessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their terri-
tory they are a 'separate people' possessing 'the power of regulating their 
internal and social relations."' 18 Relying on United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 19 the Supreme Court found that Congressional 
delegation of alcohol regulation to tribes was valid partially because In-
dian tribes have "independent authority over matters that affect the inter-
a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe (an "Indian") who is present on a reservation other 
than his or her own. (For example, Duro v. Reina deals with a member of the Torres-Martinez Band 
of Cahuilla Mission Indians who was accused of committing a crime against a member of the Gila 
River Indian Tribe while within the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community. In this case, both 
the suspect and the victim would be regarded as "non-member Indians.") The term "non-Indian" is 
commonly used to refer to a person who is not legally defined as an "Indian." 
13 See 18 U.S.C. ~ ll54(a). 
14. Codified at 18 U.S.C. ~ 1161. 
15. The statute also requires that the tribal law must be "certified by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, and published in the Federal Register." 18 U.S.C. § 1161. Further, once the tribe has legalized 
alcohol, activities involving alcohol must also be in conformity with state law. See id. 
16. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 548. 
17. See United States v. Mazurie, 487 F.2d 14 (lOth Cir. 1973). 
18. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at S48 (quoting Worchester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. SIS, SS7 (1832); United 
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 37S, 381-82 (1886); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 
US. 164, 173 (1973)) (citations omitted). 
19. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (which interestingly is not an Indian law case). 
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nal and social relations of tribal life."2° Further, "independent tribal au-
thority is quite sufficient to protect Congress' decision to vest in tribal 
councils this portion of its own authority 'to regulate Commerce ... with 
the Indian tribes.'" 21 
Because the Congressional delegation of liquor control authority to 
the tribe was valid, the Mazuries were required to comply with the stric-
tures of tribal law. Since the Mazuries were not in compliance with tribal 
law, they were in violation of federal law and the federal convictions 
were reinstated by the Supreme Court. 22 Thus when provided for by 
Congress, tribes may pass laws with criminal implications that are en-
forceable through criminal prosecution in federal court. While Mazurie 
does not expand tribal criminal jurisdiction via enforcement in the tribe's 
own court system, it does acknowledge expansion of tribal criminal ju-
risdiction by making certain federal laws dependent upon tribal legisla-
tion. Mazurie holds unique implications that will be discussed later in 
this article. 
B. Oliphant and its Progeny 
The second case of significant import to tribal criminal jurisdiction is 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 23 Like Mazurie, the Oliphant case 
deals with the conduct of non-Indians within Indian country. The two de-
fendants were Mark Oliphant, a non-Indian who was accused of assault-
ing a tribal police officer and resisting arrest, and Daniel Belgarde, a 
non-Indian who was charged with reckless endangerment and damaging 
tribal property after allegedly leading tribal police on a high-speed chase 
which ended when he collided with a tribal police vehicle. The incidents 
occurred on the Port Madison reservation which is governed by the 
Suquamish Indian Tribe. Both defendants were charged in tribal court. 
The defendants responded by filing for federal habeas corpus relief 
claiming that the tribal court had no criminal jurisdiction over them be-
cause they were non-Indians. Both the federal district court and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals denied the habeas petitions. 24 The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the "power to preserve order on the reservation ... is a sine 
qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed."25 
The Supreme Court's Oliphant decision gives much detail about the 
demographics of the reservation. The Court noted that the reservation 
20. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. at 559. 
23. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
24. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9'" Cir. 1976). 
25. !d. at I 009. 
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was populated by 2,928 non-Indians and only 50 Suquamish tribal mem-
bers; and the land was 63% non-Indian owned.26 The Court noted that 
under Talton v. Mayes, 27 tribal governments are not bound by the Bill of 
Rights of the United States Constitution, that the protections afforded by 
the Indian Civil Rights Act are not identical to the rights afforded in fed-
eral criminal proceedings, and that non-Indians can not serve on 
Suquamish tribal courtjuries. 28 Even though the Supreme Court found no 
statute nor treaty provision that removed the Suquamish Tribe's criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court held that by "implication" the 
Suquamish Tribe's judiciary had no such jurisdiction.29 At a minimum, 
the case stands for the principle that a small minority should not be al-
lowed to dictate law over a large majority in a court that has less proce-
dural protection than the majority would otherwise be entitled to. The 
Court even went so far as to hold that as a whole, "Indian tribes do not 
have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians. "30 Thus, this de-
cision purports to apply not only to reservations with less than 2% tribal 
member populations, but to all tribes. The devastating implications of the 
Oliphant case to tribal sovereignty is obvious; it's impact will be dis-
cussed later in this article. 
C. Wheeler and its Progeny 
United States v. Wheeler31 was handed down only sixteen days after 
Oliphant. Anthony Wheeler was an enrolled member of the Navajo Na-
tion. He was arrested by Navajo Nation tribal police and later pled guilty 
in Navajo Nation tribal court to disorderly conduct and contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor.32 He was then charged in federal court with 
statutory rape33 for conduct arising from the same incident. The appeal 
rested on the defendant's contention that the second prosecution was 
barred by the double jeopardy clause contained in the 51h Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. The Court noted that: 
26. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193 n.l. 
27. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
28. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193-194. 
29. See id. 
30. !d. at 212. 
31. 435U.S.313(1978). 
32. Respectively in violation of 17 NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE § 351 ( 1969) and 17 NAVAJO 
TRIBAL CODE§ 321 (1969). These sections are now codified at 17 NAVAJO NATION CODE§ 483 
(Equity 1995) and 17 NAVAJO NATION CODE§ 313 (Equity 1995). 
33. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2032 (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)) and 18 U.S.C. § 
1153 (commonly known as the Major Crimes Act which gives the federal government jurisdiction 
over certain enumerated offenses committed in Indian country). 
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It is undisputed that Indian tribes have power to enforce their criminal 
laws against tribe members. Although physically within the territory of 
the United States and subject to ultimate federal control, they nonethe-
less remain a separate people, with the power of regulating their inter-
nal and social relations. Their right of internal self-government includes 
the right to prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to enforce 
h I b . . I . 'l4 t ose aws y cnmma sanctiOns.· 
The Court held that tribal criminal jurisdiction is retained unless that 
aspect of tribal sovereignty is "withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by im-
plication as a necessary result of their dependent status .... "35 Since the 
Navajo Nation's criminal jurisdiction over its tribal members was never 
divested, it had retained its criminal jurisdiction. The Court also held that 
Indian tribes are not federal agencies, but rather derive their sovereignty 
independently.'6 Since Wheeler's first prosecution was by a sovereign 
separate from the United States, double jeopardy was not implicated by a 
subsequent federal prosecution. While this case did not espouse novel 
legal principles, it did settle the tribal/federal double jeopardy issue. 
After the Wheeler and Oliphant decisions were handed down, one 
major issue about tribal criminal jurisdiction remained: Did tribal courts 
have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians? The seeds for this 
question were laid by the Supreme Court in Wheeler by limiting its hold-
ing to criminal jurisdiction over a tribe's own members when it stated, 
"The Navajo Tribe's power to punish offenses against tribal law commit-
ted by its members is an aspect of retained tribal sovereignty .... "37 
The Supreme Court's answer to this question came in Duro v. Re-
ina.'8 In that case, Albert Duro, a member of the Torres-Martinez Band 
of Cahuilla Mission Indians of California, was accused of illegally firing 
a weapon in the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community in Ari-
zona. He was charged in tribal court for a violation of tribal law. The de-
fendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court challenging 
the tribal court's jurisdiction over him since he was not a member of the 
Pima-Maricopa Tribe. Following Oliphant, the Supreme Court found that 
tribal courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 
Congress responded by passing legislation39 over-turning the holding of 
Duro v. Reina by amending the federal definition of tribal "powers of 
34. Wheeler. 435 U.S. at 323. 
35. !d. 
36. See id. 
37. !d. at 326-327. 
38. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
39. For a history of the "Duro-fix" legislation, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and 
the Lefiislation That Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
767 (1993). 
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self-government" in the Indian Civil Rights Act to include "the inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."40 
Unfortunately, Congress' amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act 
did not end the issue. The argument is now being raised that Congress' 
stated affirmation of tribal inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians basically amounts to a delegation of federal criminal ju-
risdiction to the tribes. The implication is that if a non-member Indian is 
prosecuted in tribal court for a misdemeanor and then is prosecuted later 
in federal court for a felony due to conduct arising out of the same inci-
dent, then the subsequent federal prosecution is barred under double 
jeopardy principles (despite the holding of Wheeler). 41 
Robert Weaselhead, Jr., a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe of 
Montana, pled guilty in Winnebago Tribal Court in Nebraska to misde-
meanor charges of sexual assault, contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor, criminal trespass, and child abuse. He was later prosecuted in fed-
eral court on a federal charge arising from the same incident. Relying 
largely on Wheeler, the federal district court rightly found that double 
jeopardy did not prevent the federal action.42 However, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed and found that the tribal court had acted 
under federal authority when it convicted a non-member Indian for a 
tribal offense and that double jeopardy barred subsequent federal prose-
cution.43 Less than three months later, the Eighth Circuit vacated its deci-
sion44 and affirmed the District Court.45 The Supreme Court has now de-
nied certiorari.46 Weaselhead-type arguments are still being raised in 
both federal court47 and tribal court.48 Should the Weaselhead defense 
ever take hold, a can of jurisdictional worms will be opened, and non-
member Indian defendants will be rushing to plead guilty to misde-
meanor offenses in tribal court in order to avoid felony charges in federal 
40. 25 U.S.C. ~ 1301(2) (emphasis added). 
41. In upholding inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over a tribe's own members, the Su-
preme Court specifically stated: "We do not mean to imply that a tribe which was deprived of that 
right by statute or treaty and then regained it by Act of Congress would necessarily be an arm of the 
Federal Government. That interesting question is not before us, and we express no opinion thereon." 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328 n. 28. 
42. See United States v. Weaselhead, 36 F.Supp.2d 908 (D. Neb. 1997). 
43. See United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998). 
44. On December 4, 1998. 
45. See United States v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999). 
46. See_ U.S._, 120 S.Ct. 82 (1999). 
47. See, e.g. Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act delegate federal authority to tribes and do not affirm 
an inherent tribal power). 
48. See, e.g., Means v. District Court, SC-CV-61-98 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1999) (uphold-
ing Navajo Nation criminal jurisdiction over a non-member Indian). 
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court. This dangerous result can be avoided by recognition that Congress 
has plenary authority over Indian country matters and that by amending 
the Indian Civil Rights Act, it was affirming the inherent criminal juris-
dictional authority that tribes had over all Indians. As noted by the Su-
preme Court in Wheeler, "[ w ]ere the tribal prosecution held to bar the 
federal one, important federal interests in the prosecution of major of-
fenses on Indian reservations would be frustrated."49 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN TRIO LOGY 
The modern trilogy of Mazurie, Oliphant, and Wheeler has had a ma-
jor impact on tribal criminal jurisdiction during the last twenty-five 
years. Mazurie has reinforced the ability of tribes to use tribal law in a 
federal criminal law setting. After the encouragement of Wheeler, devel-
opment of tribal court systems has moved forward at an exciting pace. 
On the other hand, the Oliphant decision has proven to be a large stum-
bling block to effective law enforcement and has had an adverse impact 
on public safety on the reservations for both Indians and non-Indians. 
Prior to the time that Mazurie upheld Congressional delegation of 
Indian country liquor control to the tribes, another federal criminal stat-
ute also relied on Congressional delegation of legislative authority to In-
dian tribes. Under the United States Code, it is a federal misdemeanor 
offense to knowingly hunt, trap or fish on Indian land without lawful au-
thority.50 Since tribal wildlife regulations usually provide the "lawful au-
thority" regarding permits, seasons, bag limits, etc.,51 this statute essen-
tially makes it a federal criminal offense to violate tribal wildlife law.52 
Under the federal Lacey Act, it is also a federal crime to do certain acts 
in furtherance of a violation of tribal wildlife law.53 
Federal involuntary manslaughter charges arising in Indian country 
under the Major Crimes Act54 also rely on tribal law for the definition of 
the underlying offense. Involuntary manslaughter is defined as "the 
unlawful killing of a human being without malice ... in the commission 
49. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 331. 
50. See 18 U.S.C. ~ 1165. 
5 I. See, e.J;., Christopher B. Chancy, Wildlife Jurisdiction in Indian Country, WILDLIFE LAW 
NEWS QUARTERLY. Summer 1996, at 9. 
52. See, e.Ji., United States v. Murdock, 132 F.3d 534 (lOth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
810 ( 1998), sustaining a federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1165 for taking an elk on the Uintah & 
Ouray Ute reservation in violation of tribal law. 
53. See 16 U.S.C. § 3371, et seq. See, e.g., United States v. Big Eagle, 881 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. I 084 (1990), sustaining a federal Lacey Act conviction regarding the 
taking of fish on the Lower Brule Sioux reservation in violation of tribal fishing law. 
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
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of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony .... " 55 If the perpetrator is 
an Indian, the definition of misdemeanor conduct in Indian country is 
most often established by the tribal laws. For example, in United States 
v. Long Elk,56 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained a federal 
manslaughter conviction where the underlying misdemeanor was the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's reckless driving statute. 
Another situation where federal criminal legislative authority has 
been delegated to tribes is where Congress has allowed tribes to deter-
mine whether specific federal sentencing laws should apply in cases aris-
ing from their reservations. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3598, the death penalty is 
not an option in regard to persons convicted of Indian country capital of-
fenses where jurisdiction is based solely on Indian country. However, 
tribes have the option to authorize the death penalty. This gives tribes the 
ability to determine whether or not the death penalty should apply within 
their reservations.57 Other federal laws with tribal opt-in provisions in-
clude a tribal option for the federal "three strikes, you're out" provision58 
and a tribal option to lower the minimum age at which an alleged federal 
juvenile delinquent can be transferred to adult status (from fifteen years 
of age to thirteen years of age).59 Under the holding of Mazurie, it is 
likely that these delegations of federal legislative authority to tribes will 
withstand challenge. Congress should continue to find ways to make fed-
eral criminal laws that apply in Indian country responsive to the needs of 
the Indian communities that these laws are designed to serve. 
At the time that the Oliphant and Wheeler decisions were handed 
down in 1978, the Supreme Court found that there were 127 courts oper-
ating on Indian reservations.60 Wheeler has encouraged tribes to develop 
their judicial systems. By 1995, there were 254 courts in Indian coun-
try.61 Many tribal judiciaries now have full-fledged mechanisms for ap-
pellate review by way of either an intertribal appellate court62 or an in-
ternal appellate court such as the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation.63 
55. 18 U.S.C. ~ 1112. 
56. 805 F.2d 826 (8"' Cir. 1986). 
57. Compare Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I, 8 (1831), in which the State of 
Georgia attempted to outlaw various Cherokee laws apparently including a tribal death penalty, with 
Ex Parte Crow Dog, I 09 U.S. 556 (1883) in which the Sioux remedy for murder was apparently a 
form of restitution. 
58. See 18 U.S.C. ~ 3559(c)(6). 
59. See 18 U.S.C. ~ 5032, para. 4. 
60. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196 n.7. 
61. See Joseph A. Myers & Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past, Present 
and Future, JUDICATURE, Nov.- Dec. 1995, at 147, 149. 
62. Such as the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals referred to in A-1 Contractors v. 
Strate, 520 U.S. 438,443 (1997). 
63. See 7 NAY AJO NATION CODE* 201(8) (1995). 
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United States Attorney General Janet Reno noted: "While the federal 
government has a significant responsibility for law enforcement in Indian 
country, tribal justice systems are ultimately the most appropriate institu-
tions for maintaining order in tribal communities. They are local institu-
tions closest to the people they serve .... "64 Likewise, Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated: "The role of tribal courts continues 
to expand, and these courts have an increasingly important role to play in 
the administration of the laws of our nation."65 
The growth in the number and sophistication of tribal courts66 has 
been matched by the development of tribal statutory and case law. To-
day, some tribal courts offer better protection to criminal defendants than 
either state or federal courts. The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) pro-
vides most of the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights in the United 
States Constitution including: prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures, prohibition of double jeopardy, prohibition of excessive bail, 
prohibition of excessive fines, prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, prohibition of bills of attainder, prohibition of ex post facto laws, a 
right against self-incrimination, a right to a speedy and public trial, a 
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, a right to 
compulsory process, a right to trial by jury, a warrant requirement, an 
equal protection clause, a due process clause, and a confrontation 
clause.67 These rights apply to criminal defendants in tribal court. Con-
victions are subject to review in federal court under habeas corpus.68 
The most significant difference to criminal defendants between the 
ICRA and the Bill of Rights is that while ICRA creates a right to assis-
tance of counsel, it is only at the criminal defendant's own expense. Un-
der the Bill of Rights, if the defendant can not afford an attorney, one is 
required to be appointed; this applies to both federal courts69 and to state 
courts.70 However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has held 
that court-appointed counsel in state court is only required if the defen-
dant will actually receive a jail sentence.71 Additionally, in a federal mis-
64. Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment To Tribal Justice Systems, JUDICATURE, Nov.--Dec. 
1995, at 113, 114. 
65. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons From the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, THE 
TRIBAL COURT RECORD, Fall 1996, at 12, 14. 
66. Even within the Oliphant decision (handed down in 1978) the Supreme Court noted that 
"present-day Indian tribal courts embody dramatic advances over their historical antecedents." Ol-
iphant, 435 U.S. at 210. 
67. See 18 U.S.C. §1302. 
68. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303. See also, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
69. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). 
70. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342 (1963). 
71. See Scott v. 111inois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
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demeanor case,72 a criminal defendant has a right to "retain counsel,"73 
and if the charge is a petty offense,74 the applicable criminal rule states 
that court-appointed counsel is not required.75 On the other hand, many 
tribal jurisdictions (which are limited to misdemeanor jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)) now either provide indigent criminal defen-
dants with a public defender as a matter of course76 or as a matter of 
right. For example, the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights provides for a right 
to court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants.77 Under Na-
vajo Nation law, the remedy for noncompliance with this section is dis-
missal of the charge.78 
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court noted that non-Indians could not 
serve on Suquamish juries.79 In the courts of the Navajo Nation, tribal 
law requires that juries must be comprised of a fair cross-section of the 
community and non-Indians must be included in tribal court jury pools.80 
The composition of a modern Navajo jury is dissimilar from the compo-
sition of a Suquamish jury in 1978. Navajo Nation Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 13 governs jury demands for misdemeanor trials in tribal court. 
By contrast, in federal court there is not even a right to a jury in a mis-
demeanor case (unless it is a "Class A" misdemeanor).81 It is also inter-
esting to note that while Navajo defendants are entitled to a speedy 
trial,~2 the federal speedy trial statute is inapplicable to federal misde-
meanors (unless it is a "Class A" misdemeanor). 83 
In the areas of right to counsel, jury trial rights, and right to a speedy 
trial, Navajo Nation courts are more protective of the rights of criminal 
defendants than federal courts are.84 Other tribal jurisdictions can also be 
72. See 18 U.S.C. ~ 357l(b)(5); 18 U.S.C. ~ 358l(b)(6) (maximum punishment one year 
imprisonment and $100,000.00 fine). 
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2)(B). 
74. See 18 U.S.C. ~ 19; 18 U.S.C. * 357l(b)(6)-(7); 18 U.S.C. * 358l(b)(7)-(9) (maximum 
punishment six months imprisonment and $5,000.00 fine). 
75. FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2)(C). 
76. For example, the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court in Dulce, New Mexico has done this since 
1992. 
77. l NAVAJONATIONCODE§7(l995). 
78. See Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, A-CR-10-90, 19 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court 
1992) 
79. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. 
80. See Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, A-CR-09-90, 8-9 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court 
(1991); George v. Navajo Tribe, 2 Nav. Rptr. l (Navajo Nation App. 1979). See also 7 NAVAJO NA-
TION CODE§ 654 (1995). 
81. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2)(F). 
82. See Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, l NAVAJO NATION CODE§ 7 (1995); 25 U.S.C. * 
1302(6); Navajo Nation v.MacDonald, A-CR-10-90 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court 1992); Navajo 
Nation v. Bedonie, 2 Nav. Rptr. 131 (Navajo Nation App. 1979). 
83. See 18 U.S.C. * 3172(2). 
84. Except for in the case of "Class A" misdemeanors, in which case these rights are virtually 
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very protective of criminal defendants' rights. If a tribal court is at least 
as protective towards its criminal defendants as the federal court system 
is, then a defendant (Indian or non-Indian) would suffer no significant 
loss of rights by appearing before a tribal court. In fact, it might be more 
advantageous to appear in the tribal forum. The federal court system may 
soon be in a position to find an exception to Oliphant where a tribe pro-
vides criminal defendants with rights that are at least equal to the rights 
afforded persons facing similar charges in the federal system. 
As a corollary to tribal court development and the enhancement of a 
criminal defendant's rights, reservation law enforcement has also been 
making great strides. By the mid-1990's, there were 2,070 tribal police 
officers85 and 168 tribal criminal investigators providing services in In-
dian country.86 These officers serve about 1.4 million Native American 
people on or near approximately 56 million acres of Indian country in the 
continental United States.87 
As demonstrated in the Oliphant case, tribal police work can be ex-
tremely dangerous. At the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's 
Indian Police Academy, in Artesia, New Mexico, there is a monument 
"[d]edicated to those brave law enforcement officers who made the su-
preme sacrifice in Indian country"88 commemorating seventy-five law 
enforcement officers killed in the line of duty in Indian country (thirty-
four of that total were killed since the beginning of 1975). Tribal police 
are usually among the first law enforcement agencies to respond to res-
ervation crime scenes, to make contact with crime suspects and victims, 
and to attempt to defuse potentially volatile situations. Tribal police work 
and the resulting tribal court caseloads have been greatly increasing since 
Wheeler; however, public safety in Indian country has been severely 
compromised by Oliphant. 
Although national crime rates in the United States have been declin-
ing in recent years, crime rates in Indian country are on the rise. In addi-
tion, it is particularly noteworthy that from 1992-1996 
the same. 
85. This figure includes federal Bureau of Indian Affairs police officers. UNITED STATES 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 32 (February 1999). citing to 
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND LoCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ( 1996). 
86. This figure includes criminal investigators from the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs. RE-
PORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR INDIAN COUNTRY LAW ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS-
FINAL REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 8 (10-31-97). 
This report is available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/ucredact.htm>. 
87. See id. at 6. 
88. A picture of the memorial is available at the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs web-
page. <http://bia1aw.fedwor1d.gov/memoria1.htm>. 
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[a]t least 70% of the violent victimizations experienced by American 
Indians are committed by persons not of the same race - a substantially 
higher rate of interracial violence than experienced by white or black 
victims. American Indian victims of rape/sexual assault most often re-
ported that the victimization involved an offender of a different race. 
About 9 in 10 American Indian victims of rape or sexual assault were 
estimated to have had assailants who were white or black. 89 
185 
At least 67% of American Indian victims of simple assault, at least 
73% of American Indian victims of aggravated assault, and at least 79% 
of American Indian victims of robbery reported that their assailants were 
non-Indian?) These figures show that a great problem exists in the rate 
that non-Indian criminals victimize our nation's first people. The fact 
that, according to Oliphant, tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians within the tribe's own territory only serves to worsen the situa-
tion.91 
Tribes have tried various methods to overcome the burden that Ol-
iphant has placed on reservation public safety. The simplest method has 
been to cross-commission police officers with Indian country in their ju-
risdiction with some combination of tribal, federal and state law en-
forcement authority. While this does not cure jurisdictional problems, it 
does allow police officers to take action, such as making arrests of sus-
pects, without having to make on-the-spot determinations as to whether a 
suspect is Indian or non-Indian and whether the victim is Indian or non-
Indian.92 If police officers are not properly commissioned by the law 
enforcement agency having jurisdiction over a suspect, they may detain 93 
the suspect until the proper authorities arrive or until he is transported to 
the proper authority. 94 For example, if a police officer with only tribal 
authority witnesses a non-Indian suspect assault another non-Indian, he 
may be limited to detaining and transporting the suspect until an officer 
89. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 7-9 
(February 1999). It should be noted that this report does not differentiate between crimes committed 
in Indian country and those committed off-reservation. 
90. See id. 
91. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
92. This also frees the officer in the field from having to make an on-the-spot determination 
as to whether a crime scene is within Indian country or not. Land status determinations are some-
times difficult in areas where Indian country is "checkerboarded" with areas that do not have Indian 
country status or where Indian country boundaries may not be clearly marked or well-known. See, 
ex, United States v. Duncan, 857 F. Supp. 852 (D. Utah 1994), finding that a count alleging bur-
glary in Fort Duchesne, Utah was proper because that community was within Indian country while 
counts alleging offenses in Roosevelt, Utah were subject to dismissal because they were not commit-
ted in Indian country. 
93. Another possible action for tribal police on some reservations is to remove the person 
from the reservation. See infra note I 05 and accompanying text. 
94. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990). 
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with state authority receives the suspect into custody.95 This can be prob-
lematic because most Indian country land is in rural areas which can cre-
ate huge travel commitments. Another problem with cross-
commissioning is the reluctance of many agencies to cross-commission 
officers from outside agencies due to fear that they may be exposing 
themselves to liability if an officer over which they may have limited 
control commits a tortious act while acting under the cross-
commissioned authority. 
Some tribal courts have treated Oliphant as creating a set of rights 
possessed by non-Indian criminal defendants. If the Defendant refuses to 
waive his Oliphant rights and submit to tribal criminal jurisdiction, then 
he is remanded into federal or state custody as might be appropriate.96 
The problem with this approach is that it is a generally accepted principle 
that parties can not create jurisdiction where none exists in the first 
place.97 
The third method used by tribal courts to assert jurisdiction over non-
Indian violators of traditionally criminal prohibitions is to decriminalize 
certain offenses in order to make Oliphant inapplicable to the case. 
Rather than seeking jail time, tribal prosecutors seek civil assessments, 
restitution, and forfeiture. 98 For example, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe has 
re-written its wildlife laws in this manner in order to allow for enforce-
ment against non-Indian poachers on the reservation.99 Use of this strat-
egy is especially helpful in the wildlife context. In New Mexico v. Mesca-
lero Apache Tribe, 100 the Supreme Court found that the state was pre-
empted from exercising wildlife jurisdiction on the Mescalero Apache 
reservation, and also noted that the state had conceded that the tribe 
95. See also Ryder v. State, 648 P.2d 774 (N.M. 1982), in which the New Mexico Supreme 
Court upheld a state traffic citation that was issued after a non-cross-commissioned federal BIA po-
lice officer detained a non-Indian on the Mescalero Apache reservation until a BIA officer with state 
authority arrived and issued the citation. 
96. It is recognized that state courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians that commit 
offenses against other non-Indians. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881 ); Draper v. 
United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). Likewise, state courts probably have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians that commit "victimless" crimes. But see 3 U.S. Op. OLC Ill (1979) (suggesting the 
possibility of federal jurisdiction if a case involves direct injury to Indian interests). Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1152, there is federal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian 
country. 
97. As a practical matter, this problem almost never comes up. If a non-Indian criminal de-
fendant in tribal court waives a potential jurisdictional defense under Oliphant, he is probably al-
ready committed to the idea that he would rather be subject to tribal authority than state or federal 
jurisdiction and it is unlikely that he will raise the issue later. 
98. The Supreme Court has found that civil forfeiture proceedings are not criminal actions. 
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996). See also Christopher B. Chaney, The Impact of Ursery 
on Tribal Wildlife Law Enforcement, WILDLIFE LAW NEWS QUARTERLY, Fall/Winter 1996, at 14. 
99. See Title 10, JICRARILLA APACHE TRIBAL CODE (1987 as amended 1992). 
100. 462 u.s. 324 (1983). 
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could regulate persons who were not members of the tribe. 101 Other 
tribes, such as the Navajo Nation, have decriminalized their traffic 
laws. 102 The problem with this strategy is that states often oppose tribal 
efforts to decriminalize offenses, 103 and most traditional criminal of-
fenses are best handled in the criminal context. 
Another method used by some tribes to exert criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians involves the use of the tribal exclusionary power. Gen-
erally, states may not exclude persons from their boundaries; 104 however, 
the power of Indian tribes to exclude has been well established. 105 Some 
tribes have taken the position that exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians is a lesser-included power of the tribal authority to remove 
persons from tribal lands. In other words, non-Indians who commit of-
fenses on the reservation and then choose not to submit to tribal criminal 
jurisdiction can be excluded from the tribe's territory. This can be a very 
powerful tool because many non-Indians live or work in Indian country. 
Because exclusion is such a drastic remedy, exercise of the tribal exclu-
sionary power is oftentimes strictly regulated by tribal law. 106 While ac-
knowledging this jurisdictional theory, the Supreme Court has yet to rule 
on the legality of non-Indian acquiescence to tribal criminal jurisdiction 
in exchange for forbearance of the tribal exclusionary power. 107 
Related to some of the theories set forth above as a basis for the as-
sertion of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, is the idea that 
non-Indians could consent to such jurisdiction. 108 For example, Navajo 
Nation v. Hunter109 involved the question as to whether a tribal prosecu-
tor was required under Navajo Nation tribal law to prove that a criminal 
defendant was an Indian in order to sustain a conviction. The Supreme 
Court of the Navajo Nation found that it was unreasonable to require the 
prosecution to prove that a defendant was an Indian before a conviction 
could be sustained. Further, the Court held that Oliphant did not create 
an absolute bar to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The tribal su-
preme court cited to recent language by the United States Supreme 
Coure 10 which in turn cited to United States v. Rogers111 and Nofire v. 
101. See id. at 330. 
102. See 14NAYAJONATIONCODE§ 100(1995),etseq. 
103. See, e.g., N.M. Att'y Gen. Op. 92-07 (July 20, 1992). 
I 04. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941 ). 
105. See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 252 (1982 ed.). 
See also Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 143-145 (1982). 
106. See, e.f{., 17 NAVAJO NATION CODE § 1901 (1995), et seq.; SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN 
TRIBAL CODE § I 0-1-10 I (1989), et seq. 
107. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,689 (1990). 
I 08. See Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians, Navajo Nation Sol. Op. 92-03 ( 1992). 
109. SC-CR-07-95 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1996). 
110. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 694. 
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United States 112for the proposition that non-Indians can make them-
selves amenable to tribal law. 113 The Supreme Court of the Navajo Na-
tion suggested that persons can assume tribal relations and make them-
selves subject to tribal criminal law "by entry within the Navajo Nation 
with the consent of the Nation pursuant to Article II of the Treaty of 
1868; by marriage or cohabitation with a Navajo; or other consensual 
acts of affiliation with the Navajo Nation." 114 
The principles enunciated in Navajo Nation v. Hunter, have yet to be 
tested in the federal court system. If an appropriate case eventually 
makes its way into the federal system for review, the federal court would 
do well to recognize the broad protections afforded criminal defendants 
under tribal law, recognize the real-world problems created by Oliphant, 
and then create a workable exception to Oliphant in order to support 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While not necessarily creating any new jurisprudence, the Wheeler 
decision has helped support development of tribal judicial systems. 
Tribal courts are flourishing, becoming more accessible, and becoming 
stronger assets in the American judicial spectrum. The Mazurie decision 
has encouraged the development of tribal law especially in regard to its 
impact on federal law. This type of development helps to customize the 
application of federal law in Indian country and makes federal law more 
responsive to the needs of our nation's tribal communities. 
On the other hand, tribes have been forced into a difficult situation 
by the effects of the Oliphant decision. Even though statistics show that 
Native Americans are being victimized at alarming rates by non-Indian 
criminal perpetrators, Oliphant has prevented tribes from protecting their 
members from these acts. The Oliphant decision has adversely affected 
public safety in Indian country and has thus adversely affected public 
safety in America. 
It is time for Congress to overturn Oliphant through statutory law. 
This could be done by amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), to indicate that 
tribes have inherent criminal jurisdiction over all "persons." In the alter-
native, the Supreme Court should find an exception to Oliphant where a 
tribe provides criminal defendants with rights that are at least equal to the 
rights of persons facing similar charges in the federal system. At the very 
Ill. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). 
112. 164 U.S. 657 (1897). 
113. See Navajo Nation v. Hunter SC-CR-07-95, 9 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1996). 
114. See id. at 10. 
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least, the Supreme Court could uphold use of one or more of the theories 
that many tribal judiciaries are espousing to regain jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Regardless of the method used, elimination of the harsh effects 
of Oliphant will do nothing but improve public safety in America, espe-
cially for our first people. 
